By initially accepting the international committee's decision on the delineation of the border with Eritrea, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi lost much credibility in the eyes of the TPLF and among the Tigrayan population in the north of the country. This pushed him to then harden his tone toward Eritrea and to take control of the TPLF again. Recently, he recalled the ambassador to China (Addisalem Balema) to name him to the Effort (TPLF-owned commercial) group in Mekelle, modified the duties of three members of the TPLF's central committee (Kiros Bitew, Tewolde Agame, and Zeray Asghedom) and accepted the resignation of a fourth, Aklilu Demberkay. Nevertheless, his tactic of seeking new political allies among the Amharas and Oromos quickly reached its limits.

The Oromos strike back. The Oromo intellectual circles were thrown into opposition to the regime through the government's decision to transfer the capital of the Oromia Regional State from Addis Ababa (Finfine in the Oromo language) to Nazareth (Adama). The Oromo National Congress (ONC) led by Merera Gudina, a small legal organization that is a member of the United Ethiopian Democratic Front (UEDF) opposition front, had its hour of glory in late December when it organized the largest independent Oromo meeting against the government decision since that of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF, now illegal) in 1991 and 1992. The same motive increased the mobilization of Oromo students from the University of Addis Ababa and led to confrontations with the supporters of the Oromo People's Democratic Organization (OPDO, ruling party). After calling the police to intervene, the government excluded hundreds of students, and fourteen of them who were considered leaders were brought before the courts. The hardening of Oromo intellectuals and elders had a boomerang effect on the OPDO by digging a hole between the organization's leaders (Juneidin Sado, Abadula Gemeda, etc.), who agree with the government's positions; and mid-level executives, who are closer to the Oromo population and are more inclined to think that the government is on the wrong track.

Tribal conflict in Gambella

In the west of the country at the border with Sudan, tribal confrontations between Anuak and Nuer nomads have left hundreds of victims and thousands of refugees in the last few weeks. Instead of bringing calm, the intervention of five thousand Ethiopian soldiers aggravated the situation, especially after they were guilty of massacring Anuak civilians in retaliation against the armed attacks that had targeted them. In mid-January, the president of Gambella Regional State, Okelo Akuai, an Anuak, was reported missing with his driver and his two bodyguards. If he was not killed in these confrontations, he no doubt fled to Sudan like many other Anuaks have.

The temptation of war

In this climate, some Ethiopian leaders are tempted by a resumption of the armed conflict with Eritrea to again stir Ethiopian nationalist feelings and tighten the ranks around the government of Addis Ababa. But the Ethiopian army is not ready. During a meeting in late December with superior officers, Chief of Staff Samora Yunis asserted that there was a "75% chance of a new war with Eritrea," but the officers retorted that it would not be easy to prepare the soldiers for this eventuality. The recruitment of army volunteers has made no progress in Addis Ababa, and has transformed itself into a forced conscription of young men in the Gurage and Oromo regions. The Addis Ababa government, therefore, is for the moment sticking to a war of words with Eritrea, and is secretly giving its support to Eritrean opposition groups. But Asmara is much stronger at this little game, as evidenced by its support to Ethiopian rebels from the OLF and the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF).