Ethiopia's enemies, external as well as internal, have been able to impose on us their biased and poisonous interpretation of our history. As a result of their machinations, Ethiopian peoples stand now divided, mutually suspicious, one part feeling victimized and the other wishing that the past were different. So deep was the feeling of guilt that the descendants of Menelik, in a move to wipe out the crimes of the past, buried under ground all what made Ethiopia unique and viable by a radical revolution whose mottos were "land to the tiller," and "self-determination up to secession." The descendants of the conquered welcomed the self-flagellation of northerners with, unfortunately, some of them using the remorse to feed on ethnonationalist stands.

If, as Maimire asserts, the way we relate to historical events influences our political consciousness, then healing and reconciliation are unachievable unless we reappropriate the interpretation of our history by unraveling the real motives and circumstances of the southern expansion. Ethnonationalists tell us that the expansion was motivated by a colonial goal and was achieved by an alliance of Ethiopian ruling elite with colonial powers. We cannot accept this interpretation and yet continue defending the unity of Ethiopia. Likewise, the conquered cannot agree to this interpretation and shrink from requiring the breakup of the colonial empire.

What, then, is the true story of Ethiopia's southern expansion? I find no better way to unravel the story than to review the interpretation that Addis Hiwet, the author of Ethiopia: From Autocracy to Revolution, gives of Menelik's expansion. Addis epitomizes the national nihilism that took hold of Ethiopian student movement and intellectuals in the late 60s and early 70s. This nihilism was expressed by a systematic attempt to put down the achievements and merits of Ethiopian history and tradition. The favorite playground for the debasement of Ethiopia was the southern expansion.

In a frank endorsement of the colonial nature of the expansion, Addis writes: "The same historical forces that created the 'Gold Coast', the Ivory Coast, the Sudan and Kenya, were the very ones that created modern Ethiopia too. And a recognition of this fact makes modern Ethiopia no older than these African states." According to him, the circumstance of Ethiopia's expansion is the ideal condition created by the scramble for Africa. Colonial powers show the example: if you are from a country that is Christian and relatively "advanced," it is legitimate to invade and conquer those territories that are "pagan" and less "developed." They also provide the means: the possession of firearms makes conquest easy. As to the motive, it derives from the acceptance of Ethiopia to become a periphery of imperialism: conquering the vast land of southern Ethiopia, so rich with exportable products, such as coffee, gold, skins, Ivory, means responding to the trade needs of imperialism. The economic prospects and the changed context of conquest could not but push Menelik to participate, albeit as a junior player, in the scramble for Africa.

The trouble with the decision to disgrace Ethiopia's achievements is the maintenance of consistency. No sooner is Addis converting the southern expansion into a scramble carried out in league with colonial powers than he feels the need to refer the deed to the internal dynamics of Ethiopian politics. He tells us that a deep rivalry existed between Gojami, Tigrean, and Showan feudal lords for the conquest of the south. He cites "the battle of Embabo," which he depicts as "the battle between the Gojamis and the Shewan feudal armies in the scramble for Oromo territories," the background for the rivalry being the decline of the imperial power set off by "the Era of the Princes."

This appeal to a domestic conflict suggests that the expansion was inspired by an internal need, to wit, the need to put an end to the "Era of the Princes." The "feudal' lord who was able to conquer the south will undoubtedly emerge as the new unifier of Ethiopia. Since he will have enough men and enough resources to buy firearms, he will be in a position to subdue his rivals and become emperor. After the death of Tewodros, the major actors of this rivalry for the imperial throne were Yohannes, Menelik, and Tekle Haimanot.

For Addis, the fact that the expansion was first inspired by an internal rivalry for the throne does not change the circumstances and the motive of the expansion. Yet, the involvement of domestic reasons intimates that the expansion was not undertaken at the instigation of colonial powers, which instigation turns Ethiopia into a partner of colonial powers. The internal reasons liken the expansion to a traditional attempt at empire-building, something akin to the conquests of Alexander the Great or Napoleon Bonaparte. It implicates native and neighboring peoples and however much the conqueror felt superior to the conquered, the encounter falls very short of being the intrusion of overseas invaders coming to tame exotic people.

The change of the meaning of the southern expansion becomes all the more remarkable when we inquire into the root cause of the rivalry for the southern expansion. Still reluctant to provide any positive meaning to the expansion, Addis nevertheless provides once more the elements of the correct answer when he writes: "nineteenth century Ethiopia feudal warlords in particular were fully alive to the deep social-economic chasm separating Europe and Ethiopia. And it was also in the 19th century that the old cri de coeur of Ethiopian warlords-Arms and Artisans-was raised to its fullest pitch."

What else does this observation suggest but the bare truth that the rivalry for the throne was also the sine qua non for Ethiopia's survival as an independent state? Unless unity was restored around the throne, Ethiopia was bound to be the next target of the scramble. The Ethiopian ruling class was perfectly aware of this condition. Hence the southern expansion, for who controls the south not only emerges as winner but also as able to obtain the much need firearms to counter the colonial threat. The victory of Adwa fully vindicated the validity of this strategic choice.

But then, as a solution that Ethiopian leaders devised to stop a powerful enemy, the southern expansion was neither more nor less than an anti-colonialist move. Far from being impelled by a colonial design, it was an expansion inspired by the entrenched and enduring ethos of Ethiopian survival. What needs to be emphasized here is that Ethiopia had every right to conquer neighboring peoples to protect its independence against a more powerful enemy.

What are the justifications for this right to conquer? For one thing, in conquering the southern peoples Ethiopia did not cause any particular damage: had it not been for their integration into the Ethiopian political sovereignty, southern peoples would have fallen prey to colonial powers with the consequence that they would have being scattered in the expanding empires of France, Italy, and Britain. Ethiopia asserted her right to self-defense in a situation where the sovereignty of southern peoples was on the verge of extinction.

For another, Ethiopia could not allow encirclement by colonial powers, the very one that the progressive absorption of neighboring peoples was bound to create. A pertinent illustration of this danger is Italy's use of Eritrean troops (askaris) in the battle of Adwa. That colonial powers would use neighboring territories and peoples as a launching pad to invade and finally subdue Ethiopia stands to reason. Consider Menilik's statement: "if powers at a distance come forward to partition Africa between them, I do not intend to be an indifferent spectator." This often cited but, alas, misunderstood statement brings out not so much his desire to participate in the scramble as his awareness that an encirclement of the northern by colonial powers will sound the death-knell of Ethiopia's independence.

One may object that southern peoples had the right to take a shot at defending themselves against colonialism. Without a doubt they had the right, but what were their chances of withstanding the colonial onslaught? Ethiopia had the right to ask this question, for the obligation to respect the right of other people by putting in jeopardy her own right to remain independent is untenable. Self-defense is always the primary right. Let us imagine for one moment Ethiopia confined to the borders of what used to be called Abyssinia, and the picture of a hopelessly besieged country springs to mind.

Let there be no misunderstanding. The disclosure of the anticolonialist meaning of the southern expansion in no way excuses the deviations that occurred during the consolidation phase, especially once the colonial threat was momentarily removed. What happened then is a different story. The right that Ethiopia assumed to defend herself did not imply unequal treatment, still less dispossession of existing rights. On the contrary, it meant the extension of Ethiopian rights to those whose sweat and collaboration kept Ethiopia independent. Notably, the disparity between the south and the north in land ownership could not but nurture legitimate protests. But these protests must not be allowed to condemn an attempt to stop colonial invasion through the rallying of neighboring peoples round a common leadership, however violent and demeaning it turned out to be. The noblest causes of human endeavors have always exhibited a dark side. Even though it was done by force, the deep meaning of the southern expansion is the saga of some African peoples who, because they came together, realized the prowess of maintaining one African voice free.