Power politics, of course, is complex and who ever wield it is intoxicated by it; he or she exhibits propensity to carry on without the slight consideration of relinquishing the attributes of authority. Even in relatively democratic systems, power corrupts, but thanks to term limits and referenda to recall elected officials, at least constancy and change is guaranteed under these systems.

In authoritarian systems, quite obviously, the single or few leaders are the final arbiters and decision makers. The functions of the legislature are reduced to rubber-stamping, and the broad masses are systematically made idle spectators.

There is abundant literature (sociological and psychological analyses) on power politics, and more specifically on dictatorships and the iron rule of oligarchy. Even those leaders who set out a political agenda with slogans that appeal to the people (such as ‘democracy,’ ‘equality,’ ‘national liberation,’ ‘broad masses’ etc.) end in becoming the worst dictators. It does not require a genius to figure out that the Derg/WPE and the TPLF/EPRDF regimes best exemplify the latter varieties.

All hitherto popular movements, which profess the good for the entire community inevitably contradict themselves. The question of power remains a problem and rather proceeds in a natural cycle. The leaders of the movement first seize power from the masses, but the power eventually rises above the masses and is even directed against them. In such relations between fellow travelers and idolaters, megalomania is apt to develop. Robert Michels promoted this paradigm in political sociology in the formative period of the 20th century. Michels contends,

Michels’ diagnosis is indeed prophetic! The psychology of power and oligarchic tendencies, that we have touched upon above, in fact, are characteristics of the political phenomena that swept the continent of Africa since the dawn of independence in the early 1960s.

Most African countries experienced a transition from a multi-party to one party and, subsequently, to military rule. This type of governance, in turn, bred leaders who are either lethargic, kleptomaniac, or simply incompetent to solve complex monetary, developmental, and social problems.

Because they are lethargic, they don’t do anything to benefit the larger society; because they are kleptomaniac, their mission is to embezzle the public purse; and because they are incompetent they develop inferiority complex and resort to eliminating opposition and all sorts of social criticism.

One African regime after another eliminated formal party and/or parliamentary opposition by adopting a one party state or by allowing a seemingly multi-party (emasculated inferior parties) system but controlled by the core party. Once the core party control is achieved, the core begins to undergo so-called ‘purification process’ initiated by the few (gangs) spearheads within the party. The party purges itself, and by doing so the core of the core within the core party begins to eliminate the “old guards” and co-opt others (vultures who were waiting to get leftovers from the fresh kill) who can serve, at least temporarily, as party functionaries. The newly recruited leaders, the vultures, will then go out of their way to help accomplish the mission of the newly reconstituted dictatorship by proscribing or by banning outright the meager democratic rights such as freedom of speech and peaceful demonstration.

The vultures and their masters have to make sure that power has completely shifted from legislature to the self-appointed central committee of the core party. The ramification of the concentration of power, most certainly, anticipates the elimination of [if at all there are] autonomous and representative institutions. They also must make sure that the civil service, police, the military, the [independent?] judiciary are all controlled by the party. At this stage, the party-state has been formed. In other words, party and state have been symbolically and concretely wedded. A single political leader assumes power and political suffocation (facilitated by the vultures) becomes the order of the day. The single leader may allow symbolic but meaningless ballots and invite the people to exercise their voting rights even when it is obvious to everyone that the election process is going to be rigged at the onset. Everyone also understands that the main mission of the dictator is to extend his mandate through extra-constitutional means.

But then the fateful day arrives! No amount of political suffocation can guarantee dictators to stay in power indefinitely. We know that no empire lasts forever, and history comes with its own verdict all the time. By this, however, I mean that ultimately the people will rise up against the oppressive regime; they will not wait for history to take its own course. They are the locomotives of history and the latter just remains a concept without their action.

Ethiopians will no longer tolerate a high level of corruption, finance extravagance (kleptomania), treason, and extra-constitutional mandate. What Ethiopia needs at this juncture is an astute leadership that is ready to confront the complexity of politics, that is ready to shoulder a mammoth historical responsibility, and that is not haunted by a paralyzing grip of the past.

Transforming Ethiopia is not going to be an easy task. By transforming, I mean true historical watersheds and not ephemeral changes that may not have indelible impact on the larger Ethiopian society.

The future leaders of Ethiopia (unlike the dictators) must be willing and ready to learn from history. On top of being astute, patriotic, and committed, the post-EPRDF leadership must, of necessity, be visionary. As Giuseppe Mazzini, 19th century Italian political leader, once said, “great things are achieved by guessing the directions of one’s century.” Future leaders of Ethiopia must not simply envy what happened in Georgia and the fall of Eduard Sheverdnadze. They must be able to understand the complexity of a post-Soviet Union politics in the region and the current hegemony of unipolarity and its concomitant rationalist/realist political resurgence. And, of course, whether Mikhail Saakashvili will transform Georgia or not is yet to be seen.

Ethiopians must aim at transforming their country and should not be contented by mere change of leadership. Getting rid of Meles and the EPRDF could be a necessary measure and an action welcomed by all Ethiopians, but in the end the top priority agenda should be the development of Ethiopia and the welfare of the Ethiopian people.

It should also be known that all Ethiopians, from the able bodied citizen to the professional and intellectual, are collectively responsible in finding a new, prosperous, and better Ethiopia. Some Ethiopians are not shouldering their historical obligation, and as a result the anti-Ethiopian policy is fostered without a counterchecking force. Edmund Burke once said, “the only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is that good men do nothing.” ‘A few good men’ can make a difference, but the collective goodwill of Ethiopians is the only sure way to end dictatorship and transform Ethiopia for the better.