Bringing reason back to Ethiopian politics
By Dr. Messay Kebede
Oct 4, 2004

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Not long ago, Addis Tribune and the website Ethiomedia published my article titled, Guilt and Atonement: The Genesis of Revolutionary Spirit in Ethiopia. Since then I have received and read various reactions to the article. Some of these reactions emanate from misunderstandings over the purpose and the guiding idea of the article. I hereby give additional elements with the hope of clarifying some of the misunderstandings.

The article connected the birth of the revolutionary spirit in Ethiopia, as exemplified by the radical positions of the student movement in the '60s and early '70s, to the loss of traditional references as a result of the assault of Western education on Ethiopian values and beliefs, especially on those of Orthodox Christianity. The article did not claim to present an exhaustive account; it was simply examining one aspect, no doubt important, of the cultural confusing arising from the debasement of one's identity and spiritual references.

One basic assumption of my approach is that those explanations deriving the radicalization of students from the socioeconomic conditions of Haile Selassie's regime are basically insufficient and ultimately wrong. True, these conditions were appalling and the society was more and more polarized. But however brutal and deep the contradictions were, they were not enough to account for the rise of revolutionary convictions for the simple reason that a sensible approach would have advised reformist solutions. For a sound mind, the more momentous the problems, the more cautious the approach should be.

The point, however, is that active members of Ethiopia's educated circles simply rejected reformist solutions even before they discussed them. The standpoint reflected an a priori commitment to radical solutions that was derived neither from facts nor from sober examinations. Hence my conclusion: there was a need, most probably unconscious, for revolutionary beliefs. There was something in that generation that longed for radical solutions.

Many studies suggest that an increasing number of Ethiopian students and intellectuals became Marxist-Leninists because Marxism was a fashion, a worldwide phenomenon at that time. The rising generation understandably defined itself by embracing the dominant ideology of the time. The suggestion is not without a grain of truth, but so presented it begs the question. For something to be accepted as a fashion, it must first be valorized and judged fit to express and satisfy the aspirations of those who adopt it. Fashions are not simply imposed; they are welcomed to the extent that they respond to the expectations of a given generation.

Let us reflect for a moment on the case of the Indian student movement. Even at the height of its dominance, Marxism-Leninism did not become a fashion in India. Not that Indian students were not politically active and constantly mobilized; on the contrary, they were the most turbulent in the world. Still, they were never under the spell of radical ideologies, of social utopias that project the reconstruction of the country. They were critical of their society and mobilized to fight for concrete issues without ever developing a program of radical social changes.

Many scholars attribute this moderation of the Indian student movement to the influence of Gandhi and the control of the Congress party. Such explanation is simply beating about the bush: if Gandhi countered the magnetic influence of Lenin or Mao, is it not because young Indians did not feel the urge to put their society upside down? For what needs to be explained here is that though India was riddled with acute social problems, even extreme poverty, on top of being weighed down by the caste system, Marxism-Leninism failed to attract many educated Indians. Yet no country in the whole world should have been more receptive to a radical program of social change than India.

The lesson is that the attraction to Marxism is not caused by the gravity of social problems. Had it been so, India would have become Marxist. There is no escaping: the attraction comes from a definite psychological need that we must decipher. The need is more emotional than rational, more unconscious than conscious, more multifarious than one-sided. In a word, Ethiopian students and intellectuals became enamored with Marxism-Leninism because it appeased a deep trauma that was eating them up. To determine this unconscious longing for a radical ideology is to uncover one of the deep causes of the revolution.

This is not the place to embark on the arduous process of detecting and analyzing the trauma. Instead, I ask the reader to pay attention to the crucial relevance of such an approach. Unless we bring the deep distress to light and become aware of it, the unpleasant fact is that unconscious and emotional drives control decisions and political views, be they those of the ruling party, opposition parties or private individuals. We need to detect the hidden sickness so as to find the cure that can give us back the rational control of our decisions and positions.

I see a characteristic illustration of the persistent presence of emotional forces in the last Ethio-Eritrean war. Many observers, expatriate as well as native, have vainly tried to understand the rationales for the war. After elaborate attempts, they are forced to admit that it was an irrational war that, alas, cost the life of thousands of people. Given that the leadership that initiated this war originated on both sides from the radical Ethiopian student movement, it is worthwhile to inquiry into the psychology of that generation to understand the war.

The generation ethnicized politics on the grounds that the main problem is to bring down the Amhara domination, which it perceived as the sole culprit for all of Ethiopia's ills. The paradox is that the overthrow of Amhara domination took the roundabout way of a commitment to a radical ideology. Most supportive of ethnicization were Tigrean and Eritrean students, who also became furiously radicalized. Yet the radicalization strongly questioned and rejected the traditional Tigrean and Eritrean societies and values as well as leaders, thereby lowering the grudge against the Amhara domination to a secondary concern. People struggled to defend Tigray and Eritrea by values and social programs that were foreign in addition to being more disruptive than Haile Selassie's autocratic incursions.

The ethnicization of Marxism-Leninism shows that the real reason for the radicalization of Tigrean and Eritrean students was no so much the famous Amhara domination as a deeper grudge against the Tigrean and Eritrean older generation, the very one that bowed to Haile Selassie's autocracy. How else can one explain that the removal of Amhara domination was judged worthwhile only on condition Tigray became socialist, and of the wildest type at that? Young Tigreans and Eritreans could hope to remove the humiliation only by outdoing the failed generation and by throwing away its social system and values. That is why the movement was never about democratizing the Ethiopian society, still less restoring the Tigrean legacy. It was about demolishing the Amhara oppressor as well as the Tigrean upper class. For angered Tigreans, it had to be total revolution or nothing; for Eritreans, independence alone was acceptable.

Unfortunately, the way victory over the Derg was achieved and humiliation removed was fraught with another potential source of conflict. For it set the TPLF and EPLF on a collusion course over the title of which organization, Tigrean or Eritrean, played the decisive role in demolishing the Derg. Not only the organization that has the highest merit assumes hegemony, but also the major partner leaves the junior ally in a state of frustration by taking the main credit. For the subordinate assistant, the humiliation still lingers on. By the way, it is this very emotional need to wipe out humiliation that prevented an alliance between the TPLF and EPRP. Perceived as Amhara dominated organization, whatever was achieved through an alliance with the EPRP was rigged in advance for Tigrean revolutionaries, even if the alliance was the most reasonable option.

Because the need to remove humiliation by military deeds so as to renew the masculinity of the ethnic group was constantly questioned by the agonizing uncertainty about the major actor, the fall of the Derg immediately unleashed an all-out competition between the two partners. So long as the question was not resolved, the emotional trauma that radicalized Tigreans and Eritreans since their young age could not be appeased. As issues of friction accumulated, the need to settle the dispute by a military showdown became overriding.

Everything was done to avoid all avenues leading to a peaceful settlement. When finally the war broke out and the one party had the upper hand after huge human and material sacrifices, a peaceful settlement in which neither party gained anything was quickly agreed upon. Clearly, the military confrontation was caused neither by interests nor by anything that we can call rational. Because neither party wants to recognize the deep emotional roots of the war, another showdown is most likely to take place because the defeated party is now tortured by the implication that its independence is a TPLF gift after all.

Another case of a political position sustained by a deep emotional trauma is OLF's claim to independence. Nobody can find any rational reason for this claim, all the more so as it comes from a party that professes to represent the majority of the people and the richest region of the country. The claim to independence instead of defending the right of the majority is anything but logical. What guides OLF's position is not reason but the need to eradicate humiliation by going back into the past and demolishing Menelik's empire. Only thus can the deep trauma of defeat and humiliation be removed.

Nowhere is this need to appease a trauma better illustrated than by the fanatical consensus of ethnic parties on the right to self-determination that even includes secession. Politically, the principle is utterly unsound and unworkable; its function is to assuage the emotional trauma that Menelik's southern expansion caused. When the whole issue is to emancipate ourselves from the emotional residues that cloud our judgments, strange is the way we sink deeper by still refusing to admit how radicalism fooled us. All nations have resulted from expansions and conquests, the difference being that those nations that overcame the trauma of conquest by channeling it into constructive works, especially economic pursuits, have achieved great success. Emotional trauma is good provided it does not devour us.

Understanding our past is precisely putting ourselves in the position of reclaiming the conscious and rational control of our social and individual life. Many of the events and developments of present-day Ethiopia appear incomprehensible because we respond to deep unconscious traumas, not to our real interests. Unless we bring these disturbances to light, our troubles will never end. Who can deny the invariable eruption of irrational, emotional hiccups that cause so many misunderstandings and suspicions each time Amhara, Tigrean, and Oromo intellectuals meet to talk about Ethiopia and its problems?